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Defining “Sexual Abuse of a Minor” in
Immigration Law: Finding a Place for Uniformity,
Fairness, and Feminism
Kate Barth
INTRODUCTION
In June 2001, twenty-year-old Juan Elias Estrada-Espinoza, a lawful
permanent resident of the United States, met Sonia Arredondo, who was
either fifteen or sixteen at the time.1 The two started a relationship, lived
together for some time with Estrada-Espinoza’s parents before moving to
their own residence, and eventually raised a child together.2 The
relationship was sanctioned by both sets of parents.3 However, in 2004 the
California District Attorney filed statutory rape charges against EstradaEspinoza and he was convicted on four counts under the California Penal
Code.4 Soon after his conviction for statutory rape, the Department of
Homeland Security commenced deportation proceedings, and EstradaEspinoza was found removable as an “aggravated felon” under 8 U.S.C. §
1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), also known as § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).5
The term “aggravated felony” is defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A)
(INA § 101(a)(43)(A)) as “murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor.”
However, as “sexual abuse of a minor” is not explicitly defined in the INA,
both the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which heard EstradaEspinoza’s appeal, and the initial panel of the Ninth Circuit, which denied
Estrada-Espinoza’s petition for review, looked to the BIA’s decision in In
re Rodriguez-Rodriguez6 for a definition.7 Rodriguez-Rodriguez tied the
term “sexual abuse of a minor” to the definition given in 18 U.S.C. §
3509(a)(8), which is a provision that construes “sexual abuse” in the context
of the rights of child witnesses.8 Under this expansive definition, the BIA
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and the initial Ninth Circuit panel concluded that Estrada-Espinoza’s state
conviction for statutory rape constituted “sexual abuse of a minor.”9
However, when the case was ordered to be reheard en banc, the Ninth
Circuit decided that “sexual abuse of a minor” should be more properly tied
to the definition given in 18 U.S.C. §§ 2242–2246, which is a set of
provisions in substantive federal criminal law.10
The Ninth Circuit’s recent reversal highlights a circuit split over the
proper definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” for the purposes of
determining an “aggravated felony” in the INA. Although the Ninth Circuit
now determines whether state convictions for statutory rape constitute
“sexual abuse of a minor” by comparing the state conviction to the
definition given in §§ 2242–2246, the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits still give deference to the BIA’s determination that § 3509(a)(8) is
the proper definition.11 The Fifth Circuit also favors the broader scope of
the § 3509(a)(8) definition, but in the slightly different context of sentence
enhancement for aggravated felons that illegally reenter.12 Adding to the
confusion, the First Circuit refuses to tie “sexual abuse of a minor” to a
federal definition and has instead indicated that any state conviction for
statutory rape constitutes an aggravated felony as intended by the INA.13
The differences between these possible definitions are striking. Section
3509(a)(8), a federal provision construing the rights of child witnesses,
reads:
[T]he term “sexual abuse” includes the employment, use,
persuasion, inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to
engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexually explicit
conduct or the rape, molestation, prostitution, or other form of
sexual exploitation of children, or incest with children.14
This definition covers all children—persons up to eighteen years of
age—and includes offenses commonly classified as indecent exposure. It
does not include an age-span gap provision—permitting, for example, a
person to engage in sexual conduct with a minor less than four years
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younger than him or her. A court referring to this provision would
presumably find that a noncitizen15 convicted under a state statute that
criminalizes consensual sex between an eighteen-year-old and a seventeenyear-old was deportable as an aggravated felon. Likewise, this definition
would allow the deportation of a person convicted under a state statute for
indecent exposure.
Sections 2242–2246, provisions in substantive federal criminal law,
would allow deportation for a much narrower range of persons convicted
under state law. The provisions read in part:
§ 2243 Sexual Abuse of a Minor or Ward. (a) Of a Minor.
Whoever . . . knowingly engages in a sexual act with another
person who (1) has attained the age of 12 years but has not attained
the age of 16 years; and (2) is at least four years younger than the
person so engaging; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this
title, imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both.
§ 2244 Abusive Sexual Contact. . . . (c) Offenses Involving
Young Children. If the sexual contact that violates this section . . .
is with an individual who has not attained the age of 12 years, the
maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for the
offense shall be twice that otherwise provided in this section.16
While definitively prohibiting sexual relations with anyone under twelveyears-old, these provisions create a separate age-span category for children
from twelve to sixteen years of age. When considered in light of the INA,
persons who are less than four years older than the child cannot be fined or
imprisoned—or deported. Additionally, the provision includes no penalty
for consensual sexual relations with children sixteen and older.
Furthermore, § 2243 requires a sexual act, which has been defined in § 2246
to mean physical contact.17 Thus, a court referring to this provision could
not deport a noncitizen who was convicted solely of indecent exposure. An
eighteen-year-old convicted of statutory rape based on his relationship with
a fifteen-year-old would also be safe from deportation, as would a fiftyyear-old who had consensual sex with a sixteen-year-old.
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Finally, defining an aggravated felony to include any state conviction for
statutory rape, as the First Circuit does, perhaps allows the broadest range
of convicted noncitizens to be deported. A potential two-step process is
collapsed into one, and a noncitizen’s state conviction leads to automatic
eligibility for deportation.
Because a noncitizen who is convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor” is
deportable as a person who has committed an aggravated felony, the
breadth of the definition chosen by the courts has far-reaching consequences
on the lives of noncitizens convicted of sex crimes. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged that deportation is “a drastic measure and at times the
equivalent of banishment or exile.”18 As immigration law trends toward
reducing the due process safeguards for noncitizens convicted of crimes, it
is ever more crucial to choose the definition that best corresponds to our
nation’s ideal immigration policy.19 While policymakers may differ on the
contours of that ideal policy, ensuring that the law is applied uniformly
throughout the states and that the law is fair to those most impacted stand as
crucial concerns of any immigration regime.
Moreover, when dealing with laws concerning sexual abuse of minors, it
remains imperative to keep in mind what society might hope to achieve
through its statutory rape laws: safeguarding a child’s chastity, preventing
predatory sexual behavior, or preserving a youth’s sexual autonomy.
Although the term “sexual abuse of a minor” encompasses a broad range of
offenses, this article focuses on statutory rape because the two possible
definitions that courts wrestle with differ mainly in their approach to
statutory rape;20 both § 3509(a)(8) and §§ 2242–2246 would find violent or
nonconsensual sexual assault offenders deportable.
This article delves into the rich feminist discourse around the history,
aims, advantages, and failings of various statutory rape regimes in order to
analyze the objectives of laws that regulate the sexual activity of children.
Although feminist theory may not appear to be a natural tool to dissect
immigration policy, § 101(a)(43)(A) offers a unique juncture between
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immigration policy and gender theory; we must not forget that in defining
the scope of “sexual abuse of a minor” the courts will, in part, be crafting
laws that shape the sexual lives of minors—a topic more extensively dealt
with by feminist scholars than immigration policymakers.21 Thus, while
rational opinions vary on the goals of immigration and statutory rape laws,
this article asserts that the most relevant definition for “sexual abuse of a
minor” is one that considers issues of fairness, uniform application of law,
and feminist theories on the proper goals of statutory rape laws.
Ultimately, this article suggests that, rather than looking to § 3509(a)(8)
or fully relying on a state conviction, courts should compare the state statute
of conviction with the definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” encoded in
substantive federal criminal law at §§ 2242–2246. Looking at the varied
decisions coming out of the BIA and the First, Second, Third, Fifth,
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits, Part I of this article will analyze the
current judicial split and the implications of the different proffered
definitions. Part II will explore the legislative history behind the insertion of
“sexual abuse of a minor” into the INA with the aim of deciphering how
Congress intended the courts to interpret the term. Shifting gears to focus on
certain factors that courts should take into account when choosing a
definition, Part III will debate what role questions of unity, fairness, and
feminist theory ought to play in defining “sexual abuse of a minor.” Finally,
Part IV will argue that §§ 2242–2246 are the best definitions to adopt
because §§ 2242–2246 are construed in favor of the noncitizen, resulting in
a more uniform application of the law, and aligns more closely with
feminist perceptions of what a statutory rape law should accomplish.

I. CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER THE DEFINITION OF “SEXUAL ABUSE OF A
MINOR”22
In Rodriguez-Rodriguez, the BIA published an opinion meant to serve as
a guide for courts grappling with the issue of how to interpret “sexual abuse
of a minor” in § 101(a)(43)(A).23 The opinion indicated that courts should
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look to § 3509(a)(8), a provision construing “sexual abuse” in the context of
the rights of child witnesses.24 The Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits,
while not weighing in on whether § 3509(a)(8) is the best possible
definition, have agreed to defer to the BIA’s opinion and have adopted the §
3509(a)(8) definition of sexual abuse.25 The Fifth Circuit has also indicated
that it adheres to the broad reading of the term “sexual abuse of a minor.”26
The Ninth Circuit, however, has explicitly rejected the § 3509(a)(8)
definition, and has decided instead to adopt the “sexual abuse of a minor”
definition as given by §§ 2242–2246, which are a set of provisions in
federal substantive criminal law.27 Choosing not to look to federal law at all,
the First Circuit has indicated that it considers all state convictions for
statutory rape to constitute aggravated felonies as they automatically fall
within the purview of the § 1101(a)(43)(A) definition of “rape.”28
A. The BIA Defines “Sexual Abuse of a Minor”
In Rodriguez-Rodriguez, the noncitizen defendant was convicted of
indecency with a child by exposure under § 21.11(a)(2) of the Texas Penal
Code.29 He was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, and five years after
his initial conviction, charged with removability as an aggravated felon
because he had been convicted of “sexual abuse of a minor.”30 A deeply
divided Board explicitly published an opinion that was meant to analyze
and determine the proper definition of “sexual abuse of minor” in §
101(a)(43)(A) of the INA.
The BIA began its analysis by looking to the congressional decision “to
provide a comprehensive statutory scheme to cover crimes against
children.”31 This congressional decision broadened the category of
“aggravated felony” in the INA to include “rape and sexual abuse of a
minor” through the 1996 passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA).32 This legislative history persuaded
the BIA to choose a definition that reflected this broad intent. The BIA
concluded that they would tie the term to a federal definition because
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removal proceedings are federal law, even though Congress did not
specifically cross-reference “sexual abuse of a minor” with a federal
provision.33 Left with the two possible federal definitions of “sexual abuse,”
the BIA found that “18 U.S.C. § 3509(a) better captures [the] broad
spectrum of sexually abusive behavior. The definition set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2242, 2243, and 2246 are, in our view, too restrictive to encompass the
numerous state crimes that can be viewed as sexual abuse.”34
The BIA also justified its choice of definition by pointing out that §
3509(a)(8) comports with the generally understood meaning of “sexual
abuse of a minor.” Looking to the definition of “sexual abuse” as commonly
defined in Black’s Law Dictionary,35 the BIA noted that “the common
usage of the term includes a broad range of maltreatment of a sexual nature,
and it does not indicate that contact is a limiting factor.”36
Board Member Guendelsberger, however, argued forcibly against §
3509(a)(8) as the correct definition.37 He pointed out that § 3509(a)(8) is a
social welfare provision and was never intended to define a criminal
offense.38 Moreover, while Guendelsberger agreed with the majority’s
finding that Congress included the term “sexual abuse of a minor” to
broaden the category of aggravated felonies, he noted that both § 3509(a)(8)
and §§ 2242–2246 expand upon this category.39 Guendelsberger also opined
that Congress was aware that federal criminal law and many state laws do
not include indecent exposure offenses under “sexual abuse of a minor.”
Therefore, “had Congress intended to include indecent exposure and other
noncontact offenses under the term ‘sexual abuse of a minor,’ it would have
explicitly so stated in the terms of the Act.”40 Finally, Guendelsberger
observed that, given the uncertainty inherent in statutory interpretation, the
majority “completely ignores the principle that ambiguities in statutory
interpretation must be resolved through reasonable interpretations in favor
of the alien.”41 For all of these reasons, Guendelsberger concluded that §§
2242–2246 would be the preferred definition.
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B. The Second, Third, Seventh, Eleventh, and Fifth Circuits Adopt §
3509(a)(8)
The Second, Third, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits have decided to defer
to the BIA’s § 3509(a)(8) definition since, under the well-established
Chevron rule,42 when Congress’s intent is uncertain and the statutory
language is unclear, reviewing courts should defer to the interpretation of
the agency that oversees the statute.43 The Second Circuit noted that “[t]he
Supreme Court has held ‘that the BIA should be accorded Chevron
deference as it gives ambiguous statutory terms concrete meaning through a
process of case-by-case adjudication.’”44 Thus, because the language of §
101(a)(43)(A) “yields no clear evidence of congressional intent as to the
scope of the phrase,”45 the Second, Third, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits
found deference to Rodriguez-Rodriguez appropriate.46
Although choosing to defer to the BIA-endorsed § 3509(a)(8)
definition,47 the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuits have by and large
withheld judgment as to whether they believe § 3509(a)(8) is the best
possible definition. Indeed, although the Third Circuit repeatedly defined
“sexual abuse of a minor” based on § 3509(a)(8), this circuit has not yet
produced an opinion analyzing the merits of such a definition. In fact, in
Stubbs v. Attorney Gen., the Third Circuit, though using § 3509(a)(8) as the
touchstone for its analysis, specifically refused to pass judgment on the BIA
interpretation.48
However, in deciding Mugalli v. Ashcroft, the Second Circuit indicated
that it believed § 3509(a)(8) to be an “appropriate” definition:
[N]ot simply because it appears somewhere in the United States
Code, but because it is consonant with the generally understood
broad meaning of the term “sexual abuse” as reflected in Black’s. .
. . It is also supported by the BIA’s reading of Congressional intent
to ‘provide . . . a comprehensive scheme to cover crimes against
children.’49
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The Mugalli court applauded the BIA for providing uniformity by using a
federal definition that applies nationwide, while simultaneously recognizing
that achieving true uniformity would probably thwart the congressional
intent to broaden the category of aggravated felony.50 The Mugalli court
noted that to ensure strict uniformity “the age of consent for purposes of
deciding whether the conviction for the crime constitutes ‘sexual abuse of a
minor’ would have to be the lowest age provided by the law of any state,”
thus resulting in an undesired “lowest common denominator” effect.51
While uniform application of federal law is important, the Second Circuit
decided that Congress acknowledged that criminal law varied by region “by
providing that the term ‘aggravated felony’ ‘applies to an offense . . .
whether in violation of Federal or State law’” and thus understood that
there would be some disunity in the application of this provision.52
The Seventh Circuit has also concluded that “the BIA’s resort to section
3509(a)(8) and its broad definition of sexual abuse is reasonable” and has
shown some preference for this definition over §§ 2242–2243, though that
court has refrained from an in-depth analysis of the merits of the two
definitions.53 In deciding Lara-Ruiz v. INS, a case involving the physical
molestation of a four-year-old, the court rejected the petitioner’s argument
that his conviction did not constitute “sexual abuse of a minor” because that
term should be defined only by § 2243, which requires the minor to be
between the ages of twelve and sixteen.54 Although the BIA had actually
concluded that the petitioner’s crime constituted sexual abuse even when
analyzed under §§ 2242–2246, the Seventh Circuit’s opinion indicated that
it favored an even wider definition of the term.55 In later cases, the Seventh
Circuit specifically reaffirmed this preference for § 3509(a)(8) over §§
2242–2243, emphasizing what they saw as the broad congressional intent
behind “sexual abuse of a minor.”56
While the Fifth Circuit has not explicitly deferred to the BIA
interpretation of “sexual abuse of a minor,” it has decided that the term has
an expansive meaning which covers indecent exposure offenses.57 In United
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States v. Zavala-Sustaita,58 the court considered the meaning of “sexual
abuse of a minor” in the context of the aggravated felony sentencing
enhancement in the Sentencing Guidelines § 2L1.2.59 The facts of the case
revolved around a noncitizen convicted under Texas Penal Code §
21.11(a)(2) for masturbating in front of two young children.60 Because the
Sentencing Guidelines indicated that the term “aggravated felony” was to
be defined by reference to § 101(a)(43)(A), the Fifth Circuit took the
opportunity to discuss what they saw as the scope of “sexual abuse of a
minor.”
In attempting to define the ordinary and common meaning of the phrase,
the Fifth Circuit looked to the American Heritage Dictionary entries for
“sexual” and “abuse” and determined that these definitions did not preclude
indecent exposure.61 Moreover, the court concluded that “[a] distinction that
treats a stranger’s brief groping of a child in a public shower as qualitatively
more serious than the conduct of an adult who verbally forces a child to
watch him repeatedly engage in sex acts is unjustifiable.”62 Discussing
congressional intent, the Fifth Circuit decided that, in not tying “sexual
abuse of a minor” to a federal provision or requiring a minimum sentence
length, Congress explicitly did not limit its meaning of the phrase.63
Although not expressly adopting the § 3509(a)(8) definition, the Fifth
Circuit discarded § 2243 as a possible definition. It concluded that Congress
might have had good reason to look outside of § 2243 for a definition since
§ 2243 “creates a substantive federal offense, while [§ 101(a)(43)(A)]
attaches consequences, in the immigration context, to offenses already
committed.”64 The court observed that under § 3509(a)(8) a noncitizen’s
offense would be considered an aggravated felony,65 and the “BIA
addressed the exact same issue” in Rodriguez-Rodriguez, holding that
“sexual abuse of a minor” encompasses indecent exposure.66 Thus, while
the Fifth Circuit never officially deferred to the BIA’s definition, nor
adopted § 3509(a)(8) on its own merits, the Zavala-Sustaita opinion
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indicated that the Court considered “sexual abuse of a minor” to be defined
in roughly the same terms as § 3509(a)(8).
C. The Ninth Circuit Defines “Sexual Abuse of a Minor”
Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey presented the Ninth Circuit with its second
pass at the § 101(a)(43)(A) definition.67 The year before Estrada-Espinoza
made its way to the circuit court, the Ninth Circuit decided Afridi v.
Gonzales, a case which required the court to define “sexual abuse of a
minor” in the context of a thirty-something-year-old man who had sexual
intercourse with a seventeen-year-old prostitute.68 In Afridi, the Ninth
Circuit deferred to the Rodriguez-Rodriguez § 3509(a)(8) definition;69 thus,
when Estrada-Espinoza first presented itself to the Ninth Circuit in 2007,
the court held that Afridi was the binding precedent and denied the petition
for review.70 However, just a year later, the court decided to accept the
Estrada-Espinoza petition for review, declared §§ 2242–2246 to be the
correct definition,71 and overturned Afridi.72
The opinion justifying the swap in definitions led its readers through a
reclassification of the aggravated felonies listed in INA § 101(a)(43). The
Ninth Circuit explained that the INA actually defined two kinds of
aggravated felonies. The first kind of aggravated felonies “refer to a broad
category of offenses, using a potentially ambiguous phrasing, [and
references] other statutory provisions for clarification.”73 The second kind
of aggravated felonies are “those that refer to a specific crime which is
already clearly defined in criminal law [and] have no need for a crossreference.”74 Because “sexual abuse of a minor” refers to the specific
federal crime enumerated in §§ 2242–2246, it falls into the latter category.75
The court thus reasoned that
[If] Congress had intended the aggravated felony “sexual abuse
of a minor” to be defined differently than the criminal offense
“sexual abuse of a minor” it could have provided a definition,
cross-referenced a different federal code provision, or even
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specified that the definition was not limited to the criminal
definition.76
Since Congress did not give any particular indication as to what the
definition should be, “the logical inference is that Congress intended ‘sexual
abuse of a minor’ to carry its standard criminal definition, on par with
‘murder’ or ‘rape.’”77 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit decided that courts
should not look to § 3509(a)(8)—the federal provision which construes the
rights of child witnesses—but rather to §§ 2242–2246, which encodes the
substantive federal crime.
The Estrada-Espinoza Court also dealt with the issue of whether
deference was due to the BIA’s choice of definition. While recognizing that,
under Chevron, deference was due to the BIA’s published decisions that
dealt with interpretation of the INA, the Court held that such deference was
inappropriate in the instant matter because “the BIA did not construe the
statute and provide a uniform definition in the decision. Rather it developed
an advisory guideline for future case-by-case interpretation.”78 According to
the Supreme Court, such interpretation lacks the force of law and does not
enjoy Chevron deference.79 Although the Ninth Circuit admitted that
Rodriguez-Rodriguez does have “the force of decisional law,” it concluded
that the opinion still served as a “guide” for defining “sexual abuse of a
minor” because it “suffers from the same imprecision that internal agency
guidelines possess.”80 Drawing from a Seventh Circuit opinion, the Ninth
Circuit agreed that “when the BIA hasn’t done anything to particularize the
meaning of a term, giving Chevron deference to its determination of that
meaning has no practical significance.”81
In addition to believing §§ 2242–2246 are the correct definition merely
because they provide the federal criminal offense and not a federal law
defining sexual abuse in another context, the Ninth Circuit argued that §§
2242–2246 were the best substantive definitions. Primarily, the Court
contended that the younger age of sexual consent given in § 2243 comports
well with the commonly understood meaning of “sexual abuse of a
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minor.”82 The court came to this conclusion after surveying state statutes
and the Model Penal Code’s provision on statutory rape, and finding that
the majority of state statutes and the Model Penal Code set the age of sexual
consent at sixteen, just like § 2243.83 The court also pointed to prior case
law which determined that consensual underage sex is not necessarily
harmful to older adolescents.84
D. The First Circuit Considers “Sexual Abuse of a Minor”
Although the First Circuit has yet to produce an opinion that fully
grapples with defining “sexual abuse of a minor,” it has decided two cases
which required it to touch upon the issue.85 In 2001, when determining
whether a stepfather’s conviction for touching his 13-year-old stepdaughter’s chest and groin area constituted “sexual abuse of a minor,”86 the
First Circuit concluded that “unlawful sexual contact with a minor
approximating the federal definition [in §§ 2242–2246] is presumptively
within the amended INA’s scope.”87 While the opinion seemed to lean
toward applying the definition in §§ 2242–2246, the court recognized that
the broader § 3509(a)(8) definition was also available; although, citing
Guendelsberger’s dissent in Rodriguez-Rodriguez, it expressed concerns
over its relevance.88 However, by assuming that the noncitizen’s conduct
would be a deportable offense under either definition, the First Circuit did
not need to strongly justify its penchant for §§ 2242–2246 and left an open
question as to what definition applies.89
Five years later, in 2006, the First Circuit tackled the issue again. In Silva
v. Gonzales, the resident noncitizen pleaded guilty under Mass. Gen. Laws
Ch. 265, § 23 to a charge of statutory rape involving a fourteen-year-old
girl; the offender was probably in his early twenties at the time.90 The First
Circuit pointed out that
[B]y its plain terms, the INA provides that ‘rape’ is an
aggravated felony. . . . Here the statute of conviction, Mass. Gen.
Laws Ch. 265 §23, specifically terms the crime of conviction

VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 2 • 2010

869

870 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE

‘[r]ape.’ Under the explicit language of the INA, all rape—
including statutory rape—comes within the aggravated felony
taxonomy.91
According to this logic, any state conviction that could be classified as
some form of rape automatically qualifies as an aggravated felony under the
INA. Interestingly, such reasoning would conclude that a statutory rapist
qualifies as an aggravated felon under the “rape” prong of § 101(a)(42)(A)
and not under the “sexual abuse of a minor” prong. Thus, this opinion
actually sidesteps the difficult question of defining “sexual abuse of a
minor.”
In short, the First Circuit seems to be advocating an automatic
deportation process for noncitizens convicted under state laws of statutory
rape. Instead of determining whether the state law conviction qualifies as
“sexual abuse of a minor,” the First Circuit would automatically shunt
statutory rapists into the category of “rape” and place them on the fast track
to deportation. The advantage of such a process is the clear and efficient
standard for dealing with noncitizen statutory rapists. The downside is the
resulting fragmentation of federal law, should each noncitizen’s removal
process be tied to his or her state’s statutory rape laws. It is also probable
that tying state provisions to automatic removal would lead to vastly
overinclusive results; for example, a state could have a disjunctive statute
which covers child sexual abuse, statutory rape, and nonsexual child
abuse.92 A noncitizen convicted under such a statute for his nonsexual child
abuse might be automatically pushed into deportation proceedings under the
“rape” category. Thus, simplicity proves to be both the benefit and
weakness of this approach.

II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
One reason that courts have had such a difficult time settling on a
definition for “sexual abuse of a minor” is that Congress gave very little
direction as to the intended scope of the phrase when it passed IIRIRA—the

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

Defining "Sexual Abuse of a Minor" in Immigration Law

act that inserted “sexual abuse of a minor” into the INA. There was no
actual discussion about how the phrase should be defined; Congress
seemingly inserted the language into the INA without conscious
acknowledgment that the ambiguous provision would produce divisive
results. In looking to Congress for guidance in this statutory interpretation,
we look not to any stated intent, but rather to the subtext in the passage of
the bill, the placement of the words, and the existence of related provisions.
On the one hand, the Rodriguez-Rodriguez court’s contention that the
purpose of the IIRIRA was to broaden the grounds for deportability seems
accurate when looking at the context of the overall act.93 The IIRIRA is not
friendly to convicted noncitizens:94 it prohibits a deported aggravated felon
from ever returning to the United States,95 removes judicial discretion in
cases where deportation would automatically follow conviction,96 requires
that all convicted noncitizens be detained while awaiting deportation,97
provides for expedited removal of aggravated felons,98 eliminates a waiver
of deportation previously available to convicted noncitizens,99 greatly
reduces opportunities for appeals,100 and applies the aggravated felony
provision retroactively.101 When viewed against this sprawling background
of ever-stricter measures, it seems likely that Congress intended that the
phrase “sexual abuse of a minor” be viewed expansively.
On the other hand, word placement and the existence of related
provisions suggest that Congress did not intend for the phrase to be read as
broadly as the Rodriguez-Rodriguez court interpreted it. As noted by BIA
dissenter Guendelsberger, the placement of “sexual abuse of a minor” in the
same provision of “murder” and “rape” and at the head of a litany of
possible aggravated felonies may have indicated that Congress intended the
term to cover only the most egregious of offenses.102 Moreover, other
sexual offenses relating to children, such as pornography, are later
enumerated as aggravated felonies by § 101(a)(43)(I), making it more
probable that Congress only intended “sexual abuse of a minor” to cover
contact offenses, thus excluding indecent exposure from the definition.103
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The language of sections ultimately discarded also point to a narrower
construction of the term. When the IIRIRA was discussed in the House,
House members proposed the addition of a section entitled “Crimes of
Sexual Violence” which stated that any noncitizen convicted of “aggravated
sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual contact or other crime of
sexual violence is deportable.”104 This provision was not ultimately
included in the IIRIRA because House members deferred to the Senate
version of the bill, possibly because they recognized the Senate version
already covered such serious offenses. As argued by Guendelsberger, this
history shows that Congress envisioned “sexual abuse” as a crime of
violence, ruling out such non-aggressive offenses.105
Of course, this same reading of the legislative history preceding the
passage of the IIRIRA could also be taken as evidence that Congress
intended “sexual abuse of a minor” to encompass noncontact offenses. After
all, if Congress truly intended “sexual abuse of a minor” to cover only
crimes of violence, then why not include that key language? Also, why
would Congress enumerate a separate provision for “sexual abuse of a
minor” when “crimes of violence” already constitute grounds for
deportation under § 101(a)(43)(F)? Under this view, “sexual abuse of a
minor” must include something more than simply violent acts. As
Guendelsberger claimed in his dissent from the Rodriguez-Rodriguez
decision, “Congress was aware of the wide range of offenses constituting
child abuse and child sexual abuse.”106 If true, then why would Congress
choose not to limit the definition to a more precise meaning if they did not
actually intend for “sexual abuse of a minor” to cover this wide range of
offenses?107 Clearly, the legislative history behind IIRIRA does not give
evidence of a congressional preference for any one definition.

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

Defining "Sexual Abuse of a Minor" in Immigration Law

III. IMPORTANT ISSUES SURROUNDING THE SEARCH FOR A
DEFINITION
As exemplified by the three-way circuit split and the murky legislative
history behind the IIRIRA, there is neither agreement on what Congress
intended by “sexual abuse of a minor” nor agreement on the best
substantive definition for the term. Thus, the search for a preferred
definition must look beyond pure congressional intent. In particular,
concerns about uniformity, fairness, and the feminist goals of statutory rape
laws may flesh out the definition best suited to § 101(a)(43)(A).
A. Uniformity
As a federal body of law, immigration law is intended to be uniformly
applied across the nation. It is possible that the Constitution even mandates
such uniformity through Article I, Section 8, Clause 4, which requires
Congress “[t]o establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization.”108 Because
deportation is the harshest penal measure that our immigration law
provides, it is even more crucial that noncitizens in one state not be
deported for actions that noncitizens just across a state border are able to
commit without the same penalty. The difficulty, of course, arises when
federal immigration law is dependent on a traditional arena of state
sovereignty, such as standards of public morality.109 By depending on state
standards of criminal conduct to define deportability, the government is
allowing individual states to determine which noncitizens stay and which
are expelled.110 However, to disregard these state standards of public
morality may be seen as an encroachment on state sovereignty.
To further complicate matters, immigration law is considered civil law,
not criminal law. In the landmark decision Bugajewitz v. Adams, Justice
Holmes held that, for constitutional purposes, deportation is not “a
punishment; it is simply a refusal by the government to harbor persons
whom it does not want.”111 However, “[i]t is doubtful that Holmes could
have really meant that deportation is not punishment, if by ‘punishment’
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one means the imposition of harm or sanctions for misconduct or violation
of the law.”112 It seems more likely that “Holmes was making a technical
distinction in order to protect congressional exercise of the immigration
power from the substantive and procedural limits the Constitution places on
criminal proceedings.”113 In practice, this means that noncitizens do not
enjoy the basic rights and procedural protections that they might in the
criminal context. This includes the right to counsel, protection from double
jeopardy, protection against cruel and unusual punishment, and limitations
on ex post facto laws.114 Although deportation is an extremely severe
mechanism,115 noncitizens who are charged with criminal acts are often not
well represented or protected by the Constitution.116 Thus, it is critical to
ensure that deportation is meted with a just and uniform hand.
One article discussing the lack of uniformity in deportation matters points
out that, currently, two forms of disunity exist in federal immigration law:
First, sometimes the same conduct undertaken in different states
will lead to conflicting decisions on deportation. By defeating
normative uniformity in federal immigration law, this results in
unfairness to immigrants and may violate the Constitution’s
requirement of a uniform rule of naturalization. Second, federal
deportations based on violations of state criminal laws may not
reflect, and may directly undermine, the state policies embodied in
those laws. Although the federal government defers to state
legislatures on matters of criminal law, state legislatures do not
necessarily consider immigration law consequences when passing
legislation. This kind of nonuniformity is particularly troublesome
because it could mean that deportation decisions are grounded in
neither federal nor state policy.117
In addition to these two disunities, another kind of disunity may enter the
discourse on statutory rape laws. In the landmark case Michael M. v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it was
permissible for state statutory rape laws to discriminate based on gender.118
Although only one state currently discriminates based on gender,119 this
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ruling opens up the possibility that a male would be deported for engaging
in the same action of a female in the same state without risking deportation.
Having deportability depend on the location of a noncitizen’s act will
also lead to massively overinclusive or underinclusive immigration laws.120
After all, if deportation aims to remove dangerous noncitizens, a law that
allows for the deportation of only one individual when two individuals have
committed the same act will either result in ridding the nation of only one
dangerous offender—if the offense is, in fact, a danger to the public—or
ridding the nation of one harmless person if the offense is not actually
dangerous. Commentators have noted, “Either way, the current process does
not provide a reliable method for determining which aliens should be
deported because they are injurious to the public welfare.”121
In order to unify immigration law with respect to sexual acts, the courts
would have to interpret “sexual abuse of a minor” to include only those acts
which are criminalized in every state. This “lowest common denominator”
approach, while having the benefit of providing a predictable and uniform
standard, probably does not accurately reflect the roughly established
congressional intent to provide for expansive coverage of sexual abuse
crimes.122 Unfortunately, since immigration law does depend on the state
conviction for the initial qualification of noncitizens for deportation, it is
unlikely that any definition short of the “lowest common denominator”
would provide uniform application. However, while it may be undesirable
to choose the one approach that provides total uniformity, courts should still
strive to cut down on the extensive uneven application of immigration law
that currently exists.123
Disunity in immigration law may have serious consequences, resulting in
unfairness to the noncitizen, the inadvertent undermining of state policy,
deportations that do not reflect the intent of either federal or state
policymakers, an unwittingly gendered immigration policy, overinclusive or
underinclusive deportations, and constitutional violations. Although perhaps
impracticable to seek total uniformity, when looking for the best substantive
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definition of “sexual abuse of a minor” it is important to choose the
definition that will allow for a more even-handed application of the law.
B. Fairness
Attempting to achieve justice and fairness is an important policy when
drafting any law. As noted above, disunity in immigration law remains a
source of unfairness for the noncitizens whose lives are affected. When
deportation is determined by the state of residency, it results in inconsistent
treatment of noncitizens and basic unfairness: one noncitizen is deported
while another residing just across the state border is not deported, despite
the fact that both are engaged in the same behavior. At the same time, this
approach also leads to a distortion of federal and state policymakers’ intent.
Federal policymakers enact immigration laws to achieve certain
immigration results; unfortunately, the intended result can vary widely if the
implementation of federal law depends on individual state laws. On the
other hand, state policymakers might not consider the interaction of
immigration and state law.124 This interaction can have unseen and
undesired consequences. For example, a state legislature may choose to
expand its use of suspended sentences in order to promote criminal
rehabilitation outside of prisons. However, the state legislature may not
explicitly factor into its reasoning the fact that noncitizens who receive
suspended sentences, though serving no prison time, are still deportable. In
such a case, the increased deportability of noncitizens who otherwise might
not have received any sentence actually contradicts the state’s original
policy goals.125 The end result is that a noncitizen may be removed when his
or her deportation is desired by neither federal nor state policy.
Immigration law’s reliance on state criminal statutes also results in
noncitizens being disproportionately punished for their crimes. When
convicted of a crime, a noncitizen faces the same sentence, the same fine,
and the same prison time as a citizen. However, in addition to the criminal
punishment, the noncitizen also suffers the additional penalty of
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deportation, though neither the state legislature nor the state court may have
factored that into their sentencing recommendations.126
It is perhaps also important to note that the vast majority of noncitizens
who are charged as aggravated felons are permanent residents, with an
average length of residency of fifteen years in the United States.127 Twentyfive percent of those charged saw twenty years pass between their arrival in
the United States and their deportation proceedings.128 In a sense, these
legal noncitizens lead their lives in an America with two sets of rules;
noncitizens are expected to obey the same laws as citizens, but are also
subject to an overlay of harsher penalties for their illegal actions.
This extra burden placed on noncitizens seems potentially problematic in
light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s determination that, because noncitizens
are a discrete and insular minority without the ability to vote, laws affecting
them should be subject to heightened scrutiny.129 Of course, these equal
protection decisions were made in the context of state laws that denied
noncitizens welfare benefits or employment options.130 However, the
general principle that noncitizens are a vulnerable class of persons due to
their lack of political power and insular nature holds true in any context and
should make noncitizens particularly worthy of judicial and legislative
protection.
These protections are even more necessary today in light of the recent
trends toward harsher immigration laws.131 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of
1988,132 the Immigration Act of 1990,133 the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act of 1994,134 the Immigration and Nationality
Technical Corrections Act of 1994,135 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996,136 the IIRIRA of 1996,137 and the REAL ID Act of
2005138 have broadened the category of “aggravated felony,” have increased
penalty for the reentry to aggravated felons, have heightened entry
standards for asylum seekers, and have decreased procedural remedies
available to noncitizens. Through these acts, Congress (1) sought to
introduce summary deportation procedures and greatly narrowed judicial
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discretion and review of deportation, exclusion, and removal; (2) prohibited
aggravated felons from returning to the country; (3) increased the use of
detainment; (4) applied the aggravated felony provision retroactively; and
(5) “[took] great steps towards ‘dismissing all criminal aliens’ appeals as a
matter of law.”139
While Congress broadened the grounds for deportation, the executive
departments that handle immigration matters have somewhat floundered in
maintaining a consistent policy140 and appear to have adopted harsher
punishments for noncitizens.141 It is possible that the executive branch’s
contradictory policies “forced the INS, the BIA, and the Attorney General
into using even more heavy-handed tactics with criminal aliens than
perhaps Congress intended.”142 All in all, the current climate is one where
criminal noncitizens face harsher penalties and do not enjoy widespread
procedural remedies. Some legal commentators have decried these
increasingly restrictive immigration laws as a product of anti-immigrant
sentiment or xenophobia.143 However, whether one believes that the current
immigration laws are unfair in and of themselves, it is important to
recognize that criminal noncitizens operate in a sphere with few procedural
protections.
It is in this atmosphere of disproportionate punishments, increasingly
harsh laws, and fewer procedural protections that the classic “rule of lenity”
should be applied in favor of noncitizens. This rule, which states that
ambiguities in the law should be interpreted in favor of defendants, was
succinctly enunciated by Justice Douglas in an early opinion dealing with
the potential deportation of a noncitizen convicted of murder:
We resolve the doubts in favor of that construction because
deportation is a drastic measure and at times the equivalent of
banishment of exile. It is the forfeiture for misconduct of a
residence in this country. Such a forfeiture is a penalty. To
construe this statutory provision less generously to the alien might
find support in logic. But since the stakes are considerable for the
individual, we will not assume that Congress meant to trench on
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his freedom beyond that which is required by the narrowest of
several possible meanings of the words used.144
This principle of statutory construction perhaps sprung from the notion
that courts should avoid constitutional questions when there are other
grounds to resolve the case, thus resulting in the Supreme Court “frequently
[stretching] language in favor of aliens when contrary interpretations would
have raised troublesome constitutional issues.”145
A long line of Supreme Court cases reaffirmed the principle that
ambiguities be construed in favor of the noncitizen. In the 1964 case of
Costello v. INS, the Court ruled that a provision in the INA allowing
deportation of any noncitizen who was convicted of two crimes of moral
turpitude “at any time after entry” did not apply to a noncitizen who was a
citizen at the time of the offenses—even though that citizenship had been
falsely acquired by willful misrepresentation.146 The Court justified its
ruling by explaining that the Court was “constrained by accepted principles
of statutory construction in this area of the law to resolve that doubt in favor
of the petitioner.”147 Two years later, the Court interpreted a statute
designed to save from deportation noncitizens who had gained entrance to
the United States through misrepresentation; the Court held that “[e]ven if
there were some doubt as to the correct construction of the statute, the doubt
should be resolved in favor of the alien.”148 The rule of lenity has also
emerged in landmark decisions relating to refugee law149 and, more
recently, in the Supreme Court’s interpretation of provisions in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act and the IIRIRA.150 The rule
of lenity “has been described as the ‘most important rule of statutory
interpretation peculiar to immigration.’”151
Achieving uniform application, heightening scrutiny for an insular class
without political power or many procedural protections, and interpreting
statutes in favor of noncitizens all stand as important concerns of justice.
When determining the scope of “sexual abuse of a minor” with an eye to
fairness, we are pointed in the direction of a definition that construes this
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term to the benefit of criminal noncitizens by encompassing a narrower
class of offenses.
C. The Feminist Goals of Statutory Rape Laws
In contemplating the scope of “sexual abuse of a minor” it is appropriate
to consider the goals that these statutory rape laws ideally hope to achieve,
and to pick the definition that best encompasses these goals. In general,
philosophers, feminists, and legal commentators agree that contemporary
statutory rape laws are aimed at protecting the young—particularly young
women—from predatory sexual behavior while preserving a youth’s sexual
autonomy; the trick is finding the proper balance between these two
goals.152 Historically, however, statutory rape laws developed to preserve a
young woman’s chastity.153 For this reason, early statutory rape laws were
often gender specific—protecting only minor females—and offered a
“promiscuity” defense to the offender.154 Although only one state continues
to have a gender-specific statutory rape statute on the books,155 the Supreme
Court has ruled that gender-based discrimination is constitutional with
regard to statutory rape laws.156 Because statutory rape springs from this
gendered font, many of the theories justifying different statutory rape
schemes are grounded in feminist thought.
Due to the historical background of paternalism and the contemporary
license for gender discrimination, some feminists harbor fears that statutory
rape laws may still unfairly deny young females their sexual autonomy.157
Other feminists, however, believe that increasingly more lenient statutory
rape laws “serve primarily to grant men sexual access to minor females.”158
This debate can be split down the lines of feminists who endorse formal
equality versus feminists who endorse substantive equality.159 Those who
advocate formal equality assert that the two genders should be treated alike,
and “[fear] that the legal establishment will confuse [biological differences]
with socially constructed differences and use them to justify discriminatory
treatment.”160 This group particularly worries about the implications of
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gendered statutory rape laws and focuses on the importance of a woman’s
right to sexual freedom, implicitly endorsing less restrictive statutory rape
laws.
On the other hand, feminists advocating substantive equality recognize
deeply entrenched gender inequalities that would distort facially neutral
treatment into a perpetuation of such inequalities.161 These feminists support
“different treatment of the sexes as long as such treatment [does] not
perpetuate or exacerbate gender inequalities.”162 Feminists endorsing
substantive equality exhibit a greater comfort with restrictive statutory rape
laws, which are more protective of a young female’s right to security from
sexual aggression.163
Identifying the proper balance between these two concerns is crucial to
achieving an acceptable statutory rape regime. Although carving out the
scope of “sexual abuse of a minor” does not actually call upon courts to
create a statutory rape regime from scratch, it does give courts the chance to
balance these competing goals. Courts must define the line between
preventing predatory behavior and protecting youths’ sexual autonomy.
This is particularly true when the consequences of such a conviction could
include deportation.
One solution may be to look to a definition that includes an age-span
provision that allows a window of permissible sexual activity between ageappropriate peers. Such activity is arguably less harmful to the adolescent
and achieves a proper balance between protection from predators and sexual
autonomy.164 Another alternative is to permit older adolescents greater
sexual autonomy while still providing strong protection for younger
children through an age-graded regime. Although age does not necessarily
indicate maturity in sexual decisionmaking, it may serve as a useful
proxy.165 Of course, if the aim of statutory rape laws is to preserve a youth’s
chastity, then allowing greater sexual autonomy for older adolescents would
be nonsensical. However, because the goals of statutory rape laws have
shifted toward protecting the youth’s freedom from sexual coercion,
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allowing older adolescents more autonomy—and less protection—would
seem appropriate.

IV. SECTIONS 2242–2246 CONTAIN THE PROPER DEFINITION FOR
“SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR”
When construing the ambiguous congressional intent behind the term
“sexual abuse of a minor,” courts must balance considerations of
uniformity, fairness, and the feminist goals of statutory rape laws. First and
foremost, it is crucial that courts tie “sexual abuse of a minor” to a federal
definition to achieve uniform and fair application. Relying on state statutory
rape convictions as a total proxy for aggravated felonies, as the First Circuit
espouses, would lead to extensive and damaging disunity. Without a single
definition, immigration law will fragment into a state-by-state determination
of “who stays” and “who goes.” Considering that state legislatures do not
usually take immigration consequences into account when passing
legislation, this would produce immigration laws unbound by federal or
state policy.
Obviously, some disunity will still occur even if “sexual abuse of a
minor” is tied to a federal definition since a noncitizen’s qualification for
consideration of deportation depends initially on the state law that convicted
the noncitizen. If the federal definition chosen is more expansive than a
state’s statutory rape law, a noncitizen could go unpunished for an act that
would cause him or her to be both convicted under another state’s law and
deported under the INA. The only way to fully avoid disunity and still
depend on state statutes of conviction is to define “sexual abuse of a minor”
as encompassing only behavior which is criminalized by all states, leading
to an undesirable lowest common denominator effect.166 Some disunity,
while regrettable, is therefore inevitable as long as federal law defers to
state standards of criminality and refuses to accept the lowest standards of
criminal conduct. Fortunately, Congress arguably indicated that some
disunity is acceptable via its statutory language.167 The crucial goal,
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therefore, is simply to reduce disunity as much as possible with the adoption
of a single unifying federal definition.
Of course, using a federal definition still leaves courts with two viable
options: § 3509(a) and §§ 2242–2246. Of these two definitions, §§ 2242–
2246 better comports with considerations of unity, fairness, and the feminist
goals behind statutory rape laws. Sections 2242–2246 are also a narrower
set of provisions, providing a lower age of sexual consent, an age-span
provision of four years for minors between the ages of 12 and 16, and a
requirement of sexual contact. Because they are narrower, §§ 2242–2246
will decrease the range of offenses for which criminal noncitizens can be
deported, resulting in a greater unity in the kinds of actions that result in
deportation. Noncitizens who commit acts that are criminalized in states
with broad statutory rape laws will receive similar treatment to those who
commit offenses in states with less expansive laws.
A narrow definition also better upholds the principle that ambiguities in
immigration law should be construed in favor of the noncitizen.168 A narrow
definition reduces the number of noncitizens who are disproportionately
punished for their crimes. Some may argue that a rule ridding the nation of
the greater number of noncitizens convicted of statutory rape is desirable
due to the grave nature of the offense. Although statutory rape is a serious
crime, “[i]f criminal punishment is to automatically follow the crime of
statutory rape we should remember that immigrants face the possibility of
overpaying by additionally losing their legal status in the United States.
Because of this heightened penalty, perhaps their cases deserve cautious
analysis.”169 Indeed, as suggested by the Supreme Court’s equal protection
decisions, this “cautious analysis” may be particularly appropriate for
noncitizens, a discrete and insular minority without the power to vote.
Sections 2242–2246 include a lower age of consent and an age-span
provision that seems to better match the goals of protecting youths’ security
from sexual predators while simultaneously allowing them sexual
autonomy. A survey of the states’ statutory rape statutes, a majority of
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which set the age of sexual consent at sixteen, show that it is commonly
accepted that older adolescents are mature enough to make sexual
decisions.170 Statutory rape laws also trend toward incorporating age-span
provisions, perhaps reflecting the belief that peer-on-peer sexual activity—
even when one peer is over eighteen—falls within the realm of youths’
permissible sexual decision-making.171 Even apart from feminist theory, the
fact that a majority of states set the age of consent at sixteen and incorporate
age-span provisions indicates that common perceptions over the proper
scope of statutory rape laws comport more with the definition given in §§
2242–2246.
Finally, defining “sexual abuse of a minor” through §§ 2242–2246 does
not impede congressional intent. Both sides of the debate agree that in
enacting IIRIRA, Congress was attempting to broaden the category of
aggravated felonies, and both § 3509(a)(8) and §§ 2242–2246 do expand
upon the previous categories. By not specifically cross-referencing “sexual
abuse of a minor” with a noncriminal section of the federal code, it seems
reasonable that Congress assumed the definition would be tied to federal
substantive criminal law. Moreover, as suggested by Guendelsberger, by
placing “sexual abuse of a minor” in the same provision as “murder” and
“rape,” at the head of a long list of offenses—some of which incorporate
other child-related sex crimes—Congress intended the term to cover the
gravest of offenses, offenses that fall within the purview of §§ 2242–2246.
In short, the narrower definition of §§ 2242–2246 will result in a greater
unity of crimes for which criminal noncitizens are eligible to be deported
and a reduction of criminal noncitizens who suffer a disproportionate
punishment of deportation. Also, §§ 2242–2246 better achieve the feminist
goal of securing youths’ sexual autonomy while not exposing youths to
sexual predators, better reflecting contemporary notions of the scope of
statutory rape laws, and more closely following the lines of congressional
intent.
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CONCLUSION
Under the plain language of § 101(a)(42)(A), either § 3509(a), §§ 2242–
2246, or full reliance on a state statute of conviction appear to be
permissible interpretations of “sexual abuse of a minor.” However, because
immigration law is rooted in federal law, it would be impermissible to allow
various definitions to attach to the same provision. The issue, therefore, is
not which definition is permissible, but which definition is most
appropriate.
The First Circuit’s total dependence on a state’s statute of conviction
would lead to an undesirable disunity of application of immigration law.
The BIA’s chosen definition, § 3509(a)(8), provides an overly broad
definition that does not comport with modern-day notions of the proper
scope for statutory rape laws. This expansive definition would also heighten
disunity by increasing the range of actions for which a noncitizen in one
state could be deported, while a noncitizen in a second state with less
restrictive laws would remain outside of the state penal law system and
ineligible for removal. Because more noncitizens would be deportable
under § 3509(a)(8), this broader definition may also heighten unfairness by
having criminal noncitizens, already presumably punished by state courts,
face a disproportionate penalty for their crimes.
The narrower scope of §§ 2242–2246 better achieves the feminist goal of
balancing the protection of youths’ security from sexual predators and the
safeguarding of youths’ sexual autonomy. Sections 2242–2246 also align
more closely with the majority of current state statutes, thus better
complying with contemporary notions of statutory rape laws. These
provisions construe the ambiguities in “sexual abuse of a minor” in favor of
the noncitizen, an even more crucial principle to uphold in this era of
harsher laws and fewer procedural protections for criminal noncitizens.
Courts should thus follow the Ninth Circuit’s approach in tying “sexual
abuse of a minor” to the definition found in §§ 2242–2246.
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difficult to imagine a doom to which the name can be applied.
JONATHAN ELLIOT, 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 555 (2nd ed., Philadelphia, Lippincott 1896).
19
See Brent K. Newcomb, Immigration Law and the Criminal Alien: A Comparison of
Policies for Arbitrary Deportations of Legal Permanent Residents Convicted of
Aggravated Felonies, 51 OKLA. L. REV. 687, 698–701 (1998) (describing the recent
legislation passed by Congress which restrict immigrants’ rights); see also William J.
Johnson, Note, When Misdemeanors are Felonies: The Aggravated Felony of Sexual
Abuse of a Minor, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 419, 423–25 (2007) (detailing the recent
history of immigration reform).
20
Note, however, that one court has discussed the difference in how the two provisions
deal with indecent exposure offenses. See United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601,
602 (5th Cir. 2000). Although the inclusion of indecent exposure as a deportable offense
stands as an important difference between the two provisions, this difference has not
generated the same amount of controversy as the difference in the statutory rape
coverage.
21
Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful Consent: Towards a New Generation of Statutory Rape
Laws, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 287, 311 (1997) (noting that the statutory rape laws were
developed to protect young women’s chastity).
22
In addition to the circuit split over what definition to use, circuits may also differ on
whether to use the categorical or modified categorical approach when applying a certain
definition. For suggestions on how courts should handle the categorical versus modified
categorical question as it relates to 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(f) “crimes of violence,” see
Shani Fregia, Comment, Statutory Rape: A Crime of Violence for Purposes of
Immigration Deportation?, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 539 (2007). Courts are also split as to
whether state misdemeanor convictions for “sexual abuse of a minor” constitute an
aggravated felony. For a fuller discussion of this circuit split, see Johnson, supra note 19.
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In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991 (B.I.A 1999).
See id. at 995–96 (finding the definition set forth in § 3509(a)(8) better captures the
wide array of sexually abusive behavior against children).
25
See James v. Mukasey, 522 F. 3d 250 (2d Cir. 2008); Mercado v. Att’y Gen., 250 F.
App’x. 515 (3d Cir. 2007); Chuno v. Att’y Gen., 250 F. App’x 484 (3d Cir. 2007);
Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452 F.3d 251 (3rd Cir. 2006); Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758
(7th Cir. 2005); Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52 (2d Cir. 2001); Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264
F.3d 1309 (11th Cir. 2001).
26
See United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
27
See Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 2008).
28
Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26, 29 (1st Cir. 2006).
29
See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 992.
30
See id.
31
See id. at 994.
32
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as
amended in 9 U.S.C.); The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C.).
33
In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 995. Even the Rodriguez-Rodriguez
dissent, written by Board Member Guendelsberger, agreed that looking to a federal
definition “achieves uniform results in situations where reliance upon fundamentally
different state law definitions would lead to a patchwork immigration law.” Id. at 1000.
34
Id. at 996.
35
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990) (defining the term sexual abuse as
“[i]llegal sex acts performed against a minor by a parent, guardian, relative, or
acquaintance”).
36
In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 996. However, it is worth noting that
the later Ninth Circuit opinion in Estrada-Espinoza questioned whether the § 3509(a)(8)
definition was consonant with common understandings of “sexual abuse of a minor” as it
raises the age of consent to eighteen. The Estrada-Espinoza court discussed the various
ages of sexual consent among the states and concluded that “[t]he fact that the vast
majority of states do not forbid consensual sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old
male or female indicates that such conduct is not necessarily abusive under the ordinary,
contemporary, and common meaning of ‘abuse.’” 546 F.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 2008).
37
Board Member Filppu also wrote a dissent, arguing that “[t]he absence of a specific
cross-reference to a federal statute . . . suggests that Congress may also have wanted us to
take into account the various approaches the states have adopted in dealing with sexual
crimes committed against minors.” Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 998.
Uncomfortable with both the broadness of § 3509(a)(8) and the narrowness of §§ 2242–
2246, Filppu did not provide a firm definition for “sexual abuse of the minor” but
remained “ill at ease providing a comprehensive answer in our first effort to grapple with
the question.” Id.
38
Id. at 1000 (Guendelsberger, dissenting) (“We are not here construing a law affording
rights, but are determining the extent to which a conviction will be treated as an
aggravated felony for purposes of immigration law. Such a classification renders an alien
removable, eliminates nearly all forms of relief from removal, and perpetually bars
24
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reentry. Given the grave consequences of such a determination, including separation from
family and other ties to this country, the more appropriate reference point is the federal
criminal law definition of ‘sexual abuse of a minor.’”).
39
See id. at 1001 (Guendelsberger, dissenting) (“Both definitions expand the categories
of aggravated felonies.”).
40
Id. at 1004 (Guendelsberger, dissenting).
41
Id. For a more in-depth discussion of this rule of lenity, see infra Part III.B.
42
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)
(“If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”).
43
See Mugalli v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 52, 55 (2nd Cir. 2001) (noting that Chevron
required the court to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 101(a)(43)(A)).
44
Id. at 55 (citing INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)).
45
Id.
46
See James v. Mukasey, 522 F.3d 250, 254 (2d Cir. 2008) (deferring to the BIA’s
interpretation of § 101(a)(43)(A) in determining whether the petitioner’s New York
conviction for rape in the third degree constituted “sexual abuse of a minor”); Mercado v.
Att’y Gen., 250 F. App’x 515, 518 (3d Cir. 2007) (looking to the BIA definition of
“sexual abuse of a minor” to determine whether the New Jersey statute of conviction
qualified); Chuno v. Att’y Gen., 250 F. App’x 484, 486 (3d Cir. 2007) (deferring to the
BIA’s § 3509(a)(8) definition of “sexual abuse of a minor”); Stubbs v. Att’y Gen., 452
F.3d 251, 265 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that the petitioner’s conviction fails to fit the BIA’s
definition of “sexual abuse of a minor”); Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758, 763 (7th Cir.
2005) (“[I]nsofar as the Board’s holding as to Gattem turns on an interpretation of the
INA, we must defer to that construction. . . .”); Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 55 (“[W]e defer to
the BIA’s interpretation of § 1101(a)(43)(A) in determining the meaning of ‘sexual
abuse of a minor.’”); Bahar v. Ashcroft, 264 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[w]e will
defer to the Board’s interpretation if it is reasonable.”).
47
The Eleventh Circuit has not specifically adopted the § 3509(a)(8) definition.
However, in the short Bahar v. Ashcroft opinion, the Eleventh Circuit favored an
expansive meaning of “sexual abuse of a minor” that did not require physical contact and
agreed to defer to the BIA’s interpretation of § 101(a)(43)(A). 264 F.3d at 1311–12.
48
See Stubbs, 452 F.3d at 265 (“Even if we assume, without deciding, that the BIA’s
interpretation is permissible, [the defendant alien’s] offense still does not qualify.”).
49
Mugalli, 258 F.3d at 58–59.
50
See id. at 59 (noting that the BIA’s nationwide definition is consistent with the general
rule that federal laws not be construed to have their meaning depend on state law).
51
Id. at 60.
52
Id. (citing INA §101(a)(43)).
53
Gattem v. Gonzalez, 412 F.3d 758, 764 (7th Cir. 2005).
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54

See Lara-Ruiz v. INS, 241 F.3d 934, 941–42 (7th Cir. 2001) (discussing why
congressional intent behind “sexual abuse of a minor” did not support such a narrow
reading).
55
See id. at 942 (“Lara-Ruiz offers no good reason why we must refer to § 2243 rather
than to § 3509.”).
56
See Espinoza-Franco v. Ashcroft, 394 F.3d 461, 464–65 (noting that “Congress
intended the phrase ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ to broadly incorporate all acts” as a
justification for rejecting the petitioner’s argument that sexual abuse be defined by §§
2241–48 instead of § 3509); Gattem, 412 F.3d at 764–65 (observing that prior case law
“put to rest our dissenting colleague’s contention that the Board has gone astray in
choosing section 3509(a) as a reference point in assessing the nature of an alien’s
conviction.”).
57
See United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 602 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that
“sexual indecency with a child by exposure constitutes ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ for
purposes of the aggravated felony sentencing enhancement on Sentencing Guidelines §
2L1.2).
58
Id. at 602.
59
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2009).
60
See Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 602 (describing the defendant noncitizen’s offense).
61
Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 604. “Sexual” is defined as “[o]f, pertaining to, affecting,
or characteristic of sex, the sexes or the sex organs and their functions.” THE AMERICAN
HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1124 (2d ed. 1982). “Abuse” is defined as “[t]o use wrongly or
improperly” or “[t]o hurt or injure by maltreatment.” Id. at 70.
62
Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 605.
63
See id. at 606–07 (“Specifically, Congress did not define ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ by
expressly referencing other provisions of the United States Code, as it did in several other
parts of § 1101(a)(43)(A). . . . Nor did Congress narrow the definition of ‘sexual abuse of
a minor’ by requiring a minimum sentence length, thereby ensuring the offense was of a
sufficient severity.”).
64
Id. at 607 n.8.
65
See id. (“This definition would seemingly cover an offense under Texas Penal Code §
21.11(a)(2). . . .”).
66
Id. at 608.
67
See Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 1147, 1150 (9th Cir. 2008). For the facts
of Estrada-Espinoza, see supra Introduction.
68
Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1214–15 (9th Cir. 2006).
69
Id. at 1216 (“The BIA’s definition was based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”).
70
See Estrada-Espinoza v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 933, 936 (2007) (“Afridi is binding
precedent and controls this case. . . . Therefore the BIA and IJ did not err in denying
relief and we must deny the petition for review.”).
71
See id. at 1152 n.2 (“[I]t is more plausible that Congress intended the ‘aggravated
felony’ of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ to incorporate the definition of ‘sexual abuse of a
minor’ in 18 U.S.C. § 2243, which is a criminal statute outlining the elements of the
offense, rather than the definition of ‘sexual abuse’ found in 18 U.S.C. § 3509.”).
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72

Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1160 n.15 (“In so holding, we necessarily overrule
Afridi v. Gonzales.”).
73
Id. at 1155. For example, INA § 101(a)(43)(B), “illicit trafficking in a controlled
substance,” and INA § 101(a)(43)(F) “crime of violence” are cross-referenced with other
federal provisions. Id.
74
Id. For example, INA § 101(a)(43)(A) “murder, rape,” INA § 101(a)(43)(G) “a theft
offense . . . or burglary offense” are not cross-referenced. Id. at 1156.
75
See id. at 1156.
76
Id. But see United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601, 607 n.8 (5th Cir. 2000)
(arguing that as federal substantive law and the INA serve very different purposes
Congress may have had good reasons for adopting different definitions).
77
Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1156.
78
Id. at 1157.
79
See id. (“The Supreme Court has instructed that ‘[i]nterpretations such as those in
opinion letters—like interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and
enforcement guidelines, all of which lack the force of law—do not warrant Chevron-style
deference.”) (citing Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)).
80
Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1157.
81
Id. (citing Mei v. Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004)) (internal quotations
removed).
82
Estrada-Espinoza, 546 F.3d at 1153 (“[U]nder national contemporary standards,
although sexual activity with a younger child is certainly abusive, sexual activity with an
older adolescent is not necessarily abusive.”).
83
See id. (analyzing trends in state statutory rape laws).
84
See id. at 1153–54 (“[O]ur prior case law—as well as common sense—suggest that,
while consensual underage sex may be psychologically harmful to a young teen, it may
not be harmful to an older one.”) (citing United States v. Lopez Solis, 447 F.3d 1201,
1208 (9th Cir. 2006). See also United States v. Pallares-Galan, 359 F.3d 1088, 1101 (9th
Cir. 2004) (pointing out that under California statutory rape laws a person can “annoy” or
“molest” a minor without injuring him or her); United States v. Melton, 344 F.3d 1021,
1028 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that “some courts have hesitated in categorically equating
the physical risks of sexual acts to minors of different age groups.”); United States v.
Thomas, 159 F.3d 296, 299 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[I]t is difficult to maintain on a priori
grounds that sex is physically dangerous to 16 year old girls.”); United States v. Kirk, 111
F.3d 390, 396 n.8 (5th Cir. 1997) (concluding that a serious potential for physical injury
does not necessarily exists with sexual contact between a nineteen-year-old and a sixteenyear-old).
85
See Emile v. INS, 244 F.3d 183 (1st Cir. 2001); Silva v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 26 (1st
Cir. 2006).
86
See Emile, 244 F.3d at 185 (describing the facts of the offense).
87
Id. at 188.
88
See id. at 165 n.2 (“Elsewhere in the federal criminal code, see 18 U.S.C. §
3509(a)(8)(1994), the term “sexual abuse” is used broadly enough that it indubitably
covers [the petitioner’s] conduct, but it is debatable how relevant this provision may
be.”).
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See id. at 165 n.1 (“We do not want to be understood as endorsing the view that every
possible violation of the federal sexual abuse chapter would automatically translate into a
deportable offense.”).
90
See Silva, 455 F.3d at 27 (describing the facts and procedural history of the case). The
immigration judge presiding over the removal proceedings determined that the
noncitizen’s state conviction was for both the crime of rape and the crime of abuse of a
child, so that the noncitizen qualified doubly as an aggravated felon. See id. On appeal,
the noncitizen argued that statutory rape did not constitute “sexual abuse of a minor” but
he did not specifically challenge the immigration judge’s determination that he had also
been convicted of the crime of rape. See id. at 28. Although the First Circuit thus
concluded that “[b]y not setting out any developed argumentation to contradict the
immigration judge’s classification of his conviction as rape, the petitioner has waived any
challenge to that determination,” the court still proceeded to answer this imputed claim,
as if it had been preserved. Id. at 29.
91
Id.
92
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:24–4(a) (West 2001).
93
See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 994 (B.I.A 1999) (“The terms
rape and sexual abuse of a minor were added in an expansion of the definition of what
constitutes an aggravated felony and an overall increase in the severity of the
consequences for aliens convicted of crimes.”).
94
See Johnson, supra note 19, at 428–33 (providing an in depth analysis of IIRIRA).
95
See IIRIRA § 301(b) (1996), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9).
96
See INA § 101(a)(48)(A) (1998), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48) (2000) (“The term
‘conviction’ means, with respect to an alien, a formal judgment of guilt of the alien
entered by a court or, if adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where—(i) a judge or
jury has found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere
or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered
some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.”).
This definition of “conviction” prevents judges from deferring adjudication in favor of
some form of probation so that the conviction would not be entered on the record, making
the alien eligible for deportation. See also Johnson, supra note 19, at 428-29 (explaining
how IIRIRA eliminated judicial discretion).
97
See The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009 § 305 (1996) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C.), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1231 (2006).
98
See IIRIRA § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1228 (2000).
99
See IIRIRA § 304(a), 8 U.S.C. §1228 (2000).
100
See IIRIRA § 306(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. §1252 (2006).
101
See IIRIRA § 321(b), 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43) (2006).
102
See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 991, 1002 (B.I.A. 1999)
(Guendelsberger, dissenting) (“The decision by Congress to place ‘sexual abuse of a
minor’ in section 101(a)(43)(A), alongside murder and rape, suggests that it was focusing
on the most egregious offenses.”). But see United States v. Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d 601,
606 n.7 (5th Cir. 2000) (“This argument would find no support in the rest of the statute,
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which includes numerous offenses within the definition of an “aggravated felony” which,
while serious, are less severe than murder or rape.”).
103
See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1002 (concluding that the scope
“sexual abuse of a minor” should be considered “in light of the overage of the other
aggravated felony categories.”).
104
IIRIRA proposed section H.R. 2202, 104th Cong. § 218 (1996).
105
See In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1003 (“Notably, proposed section
241(a)(2)(F) categorized ‘sexual abuse’ as an offense involving violence or the threat of
violence.”); see also Emile v. INS, 244 F.3d 183, 186–87 (1st Cir. 2001) (observing that
the legislative history of IIRIRA in the House makes it likely that Congress intended
“sexual abuse of a minor” to encompass conduct that would be criminal under §§ 2241,
2242, and 2244). Guendelsberger further argued that “[i]n choosing its terms, Congress
also was aware that the federal criminal law and a number of state laws employing the
‘sexual abuse of a minor’ definition limit the range of offenses covered to those involving
sexual acts or sexual contact, and do not include within their scope indecent exposure.” In
re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1003. However, the legislative history does
not indicate that Congress specifically considered either the definitions given by federal
or state law, or the Model Penal Code, which classifies indecent exposure as a
misdemeanor. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.5 (“A person commits a misdemeanor if,
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of himself or of any person other
than his spouse, he exposes his genitals under circumstances in which he knows his
conduct is likely to cause affront or alarm.”).
106
In re Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1003.
107
See Zavala-Sustaita, 214 F.3d at 606–07 (arguing that in not “expressly limiting the
meaning of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ in ways it employed in other parts of §
1101(a)(42)(A),” Congress did, in fact, intend a broad definition).
108
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 4. Although naturalization and immigration are not
synonymous, one can argue that immigration falls under the congressional power to set
up a uniform rule of naturalization. “However, it is not clear from the Constitution what
is meant by ‘uniform’ and whether such a standard applies to the application of
naturalization rules.” Christina LaBrie, Lack of Uniformity in the Deportation of Criminal
Aliens, 25 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 357, 363–64 (1999).
109
See LaBrie, supra note 108, at 365 (“Congress traditionally defers to state standards of
public morality.”).
110
See id. (“[B]y using state standards to define criminal conduct for the purposes of
immigration and naturalization laws, the federal government in effect allows itself to
deny citizenship to (or deport) an immigrant for an act that is a crime in one state but not
another.”). See also THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND
CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 567–68 (5th ed. 2003) (describing the problems with
uniformity and the aggravated felony provision).
111
228 U.S. 585, 592 (1913).
112
ALEINIKOFF, supra note 110, at 538.
113
Id.
114
See LaBrie, supra note 108 at 361 (noting that because deportation is a civil penalty
noncitizens are denied basic constitutional rights).
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115

See discussion, supra note 18.
See, e.g., Kevin Costello, Without a Country: Indefinite Detention as Constitutional
Purgatory, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 503, 508–09 (noting that the majority of courts have
found that excludable noncitizens are not protected by the Fifth Amendment); Tracey
Topper Gonzalez, Individual Rights Versus Collective Security, 11 U. MIAMI INT’L
COMP. L. REV. 75, 86–87 (discussing that constitutional protections of the Fifth, Sixth,
and Fourteenth Amendments afforded to noncitizens are not as complete as those
afforded to American citizens); LaBrie, supra note 108 at 362–63 (“Criminals who are
citizens can rely on the Constitution to provide them with procedural fairness, but
criminal aliens cannot.”).
117
Id. at 363. For examples of how the unintended consequences of the interaction
between state and immigration law can undermine state policies, see supra Part III.B.
118
450 U.S. 464, 464 (1981) (holding that a California statutory rape statute which only
criminalized having sexual relations with minor females did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
119
See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18–6101 (2009).
120
See LaBrie, supra note 108, at 367 (discussing the dangers in having the location of
the offense determine deportability).
121
Id.
122
For a fuller discussion on the “lowest common denominator” effect, see supra Part
I.B.
123
See ALEINIKOFF, supra note 110, at 568 (“Assuming that uniformity ought to be a
goal, is it achievable? Or should the goal be stated more modestly as reducing nonuniformity?”).
124
See LaBrie, supra note 108, at 363 (“State legislatures do not necessarily consider
immigration law consequences when passing legislation.”).
125
See id. at 368 (discussing how immigration law can undermine the a state’s policy
goals in implementing a greater use of suspended sentences).
126
See id. at 367 (“[A]n alien’s deportability may be determined by [the] state conviction,
even though the state court did not consider deportability in convicting or sentencing.”).
127
See TRAC Immigration, How Often is the Aggravated Felony Statute Used?,
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/158/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2010) (analyzing the
characteristics of those being charged as aggravated felons).
128
See id.
129
See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1982) (noting that “classifications based
on alienage are ‘subject to close judicial scrutiny.’”) (citation omitted); In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. 717, 721, 729 (1973) (holding that laws preventing resident noncitizens from
practicing law violated the equal protection clause as noncitizens warranted heightened
scrutiny); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“Aliens as a class are a
prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ minority for whom such heightened judicial
solicitude is appropriate.”) (citation omitted). However, despite the Court’s heightened
scrutiny of state laws which potentially violate the equal protection clause, “the Supreme
Court has established essentially no limits on Congress’s authority to define classes of
deportable citizens.” ALEINIKOFF, supra note 110, at 536.
116
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130

See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 636 (discussing a discriminatory law requiring citizenship
for public employment in positions subject to competitive examination); In re Griffiths,
413 U.S. at 718 (dealing with laws restricting noncitizens from the practice of law);
Graham, 403 U.S. at 357 (invalidating welfare laws with residency requirements).
131
See Newcomb, supra note 19, at 698–701 (describing the recent wave of strict
immigration legislation).
132
See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
133
See Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as
amended in 8 U.S.C.).
134
See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Title XIII, Pub. L. No.
103–322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
135
See Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103–
416, § 222, 108 Stat. 4305 (1994) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101).
136
See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–131, §
550(e), 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
137
See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104–208, 101 Stat. 3009–546 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.).
138
See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, 119 Stat. 302 (2005).
139
Newcomb, supra note 19, at 703 (citing Peter Hill, Did Congress Eliminate All
Judicial Review of Orders of Deportation, Exclusion, and Removal for Criminal Aliens?,
44 FED. LAW. 43, 44 (1997)); see also ALEINIKOFF, supra note 110, at 566 (“The
category of ‘aggravated felony’ has significant (some would say, overly harsh)
consequences for other aspects of immigration law.”); Johnson, supra note 19, at 425–33
(tracking the development of the aggravated felony provision).
140
These executive departments are the Department of Justice and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)—now the Department of Homeland Security. See, e.g., The
United States Department of Justice, Department of Justice Agencies,
http://www.justice.gov/agencies/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2010); The United States
Department of Homeland Security, Department Subcomponents and Agencies,
http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/structure/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2010).
141
See Newcomb, supra note 19, at 705–06 (discussing the INS, the BIA and the
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